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Problem area 
Loss of Control – In Flight (LOC-I) 
is the number one cause of fatal 
accidents in the aviation industry. It 
is therefore a primary concern for 
the international industry and is 
being addressed by regulators, 
operators, training organisations 
and manufacturers alike. The risk of 
LOC-I accidents can be 
significantly mitigated through the 
development of “Upset Prevention 
and Recovery Training” (UPRT). 
Flight Simulators can play a major 
role in UPRT, but may require some 
further development and 
enhancement. These additional 
requirements need to be defined. 
 
Description of work 
In 2009 the Royal Aeronautical 
Society established the international 
working group: International 
Committee for Aviation Training in 
Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). 
The committee consists of 
stakeholders from throughout the 
aviation industry. This group is 
tasked with defining the training 
requirements, and the technical 
facilities required for training to 
enable UPRT. 
ICATEE is currently finalising the 
initial training analysis and 
simulation requirements for 
application in the industry. These 
requirements will eventually be 
reviewed by ICAO for inclusion in 
the ICAO guidance material for 
Flight Crew Training, and Flight 
Simulation standards. 
 
The work that is being carried out 
by ICATEE covers several areas of 
the aviation industry: 
- Training requirements 
- Flight simulation standards 
- Research requirements 
- Regulatory modifications 
- Flight Crew Licensing 
- Initial & Recurrent training 
 
The current focus of the group is on 
defining the training requirements, 
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and the associated requirements for 
the training environment – 
including aircraft as well as flight 
simulators. 
 
Results and conclusions 
The training strategy being 
proposed by ICATEE is described 
as upset prevention & recovery 
training, which consists of three 
levels: 
- Awareness 
- Prevention (Recognition & 
Avoidance) 
- Recovery 
 
The training is balanced between 
academic knowledge as required for 
a basis to understand the practical 
elements of the training. These 
training requirements are detailed in 
a training matrix, that is being used 
by the sub-groups of ICATEE to 
work through the different aspects 
of the training requirements 
development. It is not the intention 
of ICATEE to define a detailed 
training syllabus, rather to define 
areas that should be included in the 
broad training of flight crew – 
across the different licences and 
training.  
 
Parallel to this the ICATEE group is 
working to define the training 
environment that is required for 
UPRT. It is agreed that the current 
training environment is not 
sufficient for full UPRT, so 
enhancements are required. This has 
also included defining training 
exercises that are carried out on 
advanced training aircraft. 
 
Given the wide application of Flight 
Simulation Training Devices within 
the industry, the ICATEE group is 
working on defining the 
enhancements that are required for 
FSTDs: 
- Aerodynamic modeling 
- Instructor feedback 
- Scenario development 
- Control authority 
- Buffet motion 
- Motion feedback 
- Upset forcing function 
 
These enhancements are being 
defined for inclusion in the 
Simulator Standards for UPRT. 
 
Applicability 
The research that is being carried 
out by ICATEE is applicable to all 
synthetic training devices used for 
flight crew training – including 
Flight Training Devices (FTD) and 
Full Flight Simulators (FFS). The 
ICATEE conclusions will be 
presented via the Royal 
Aeronautical Society and ICAO. 
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Nomenclature 
I. Introduction 
Upset Prevention and Recovery Training in Flight Simulators
Dr. Sunjoo Advani1
International Development of Technology, Breda, the Netherlands, 4823 KB  
Joris Field2
National Aerospace Laboratory - NLR, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 1059 CM
Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I), which is currently the number-one cause of aviation 
fatalities, can be mitigated through integrated upset prevention and recovery training. The 
means by which this training is conducted needs to be systematically defined to include both 
practical and academic training. To determine the training requirements as well as acceptable 
technical solutions, the Royal Aeronautical Society formed the International Committee for 
Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). This working group is defining the 
operational training objectives, the training needs (shortcomings), and the training means (or 
media) that are acceptable for addressing the threat of  LOC-I upsets. The improvements to 
flight simulators recommended by ICATEE include better incorporation of  the surprise factor, 
enhancing mathematical model fidelity in simulation, improving the realism of upset onsets, and 
improving motion cueing. The role of the instructor in providing properly executed training is 
also key to ensuring a high training standard. The paper examines the training requirements 
and technical solutions considered by ICATEE.
Nomenclature
AURTA = Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid
EASA = European Aviation Safety Agency
EGPWS = Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
FAA = Federal Aviation Administration
IATA = International Air Transport Association
ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization
ICATEE = International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes
IOS = Instructor Operator Station
LOC-I = Loss-of-Control In Flight
Vne = Never-exceed airspeed
 
I. Introduction
OSS-OF-CONTROL In-Flight (LOC-I) has become the primary cause of fatal commercial aviation fatalities, 
overtaking the prior leading cause, which was Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). Unlike CFIT, which was 
resolved primarily through the widespread introduction of Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 
(EGPWS),  there appears to be no immediate, single technical solution for reducing or eliminating LOC-I. Hence, a 
systematic approach to analyzing the problem and developing feasible solutions is needed. LOC-I events are primarily 
the result of stalls, icing, flight control system failures, spatial disorientation, and atmospheric disturbances. They 
usually involve the actions by the pilot. In a broad context, these events can cause an aircraft to enter into an upset, 
which is “an airplane in flight unintentionally exceeding the parameters normally experienced in line operations or 
training” 1.
In an attempt to address this problem, an industry/government team published the Airplane Upset Recovery Training 
Aid (AURTA) for educating pilots and recommending effective methods of recovery from upsets in large transport 
aircraft. Its use has been encouraged by the regulatory bodies like the FAA; however,  it has not been mandated. 
Consequently, its use varies widely across the industry.  The AURTA is also specifically aimed for pilots of large 
transport aircraft (100-plus seats, and with swept wings) 1.
In recognition of the problem and the need for a harmonized solution, the Flight Simulation Group of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society formed the International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). 
L
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II. Background on the Problem 
Membership in ICATEE includes operators, airframe manufacturers, trainers, simulator manufacturers, researchers, and 
regulators.
The main problem with Loss-of-Control Incidents is that the causes are widespread. The prevention of and recovery 
from upsets requires the proper application of rule-based, knowledge-based, and skill-based behaviour. The mitigation 
proposed by ICATEE is to provide training through the following levels:
I - Awareness
II - Prevention (consisting of Recognition and Avoidance of upsets)
III - Recovery
Combined, this area of training is now referred to as “upset prevention and recovery training”, or UPRT. 
The following sections of this paper review the current status of the ICATEE working group, particularly 
highlighting the requirements of the simulator-related training to prevent and recover from upsets. Section II reviews 
the background to the problem and training requirements developed within ICATEE, and the impact on the simulator 
facilities, is discussed in Section III. The integrated approach to UPRT  is brought forward in Section IV. Methods of 
improving current flight simulators to enhance their contributions to upset recovery training are suggested in Section V, 
as well as the main technical challenges associated with these possible improvements. While several training 
improvements will be realized through ICATEE’s initial recommendations to ICAO in 2012, there are many issues that 
will require additional research. These are discussed in Section VI. Open issues and conclusions are reported in Section 
VII.
II. Background on the Problem
Today, of the limited number of accidents to commercial transport airplanes LOC-I is identified as the most 
common accident category. Lambregts et. al.,2 categorize seventy-five airplane upset incidents between 1993 and 2007 
and identify common trends. Their conclusion is that 27 incidents (36%) were due to stalls induced by contaminated 
airfoils or the autopilot. Secondly, flight-control system or autopilot failures of malfunctions caused 16 (21%) of the 
incidents. Spatial disorientation and contaminated airfoils (excluding the stall related ones mentioned above) 
contributed to a further 11% each, while atmospheric disturbances and other (including unknown) events cause the 
remaining 21%. 
Operationally, pilots are rarely exposed to any parts of the flight envelope beyond the normal “centre” of that 
envelope. Typically, it has been estimated that a pilot will perform approximately two minutes of manual flying during 
any given flight in a transport category airliner. In long-range operations, the manual flight accrued per year may be as 
little as 30 minutes per pilot. At altitude, pilots are rarely exposed to the rather critical flight envelope, and the actual 
effects of approaching the airplane’s aerodynamic and performance limits. An example is the limited maneuverability at 
high altitude due to the stall speed equalling the critical Mach number - “coffin corner”.  At or near this altitude, the 
aircraft becomes more difficult to stabilize. Since most manual flying is performed at low altitude, manual operation 
including stall recovery at higher altitude appears from the accident statistics to be challenging.
Basic flight training has moved away from extensively teaching stall and spin recovery. Pilots are asked to 
demonstrate “minimum altitude loss” during a stall, by maintaining a relatively high angle-of-attack and applying 
power. While this may work successfully and repeatedly in a docile single-engine piston training airplane, large aircraft 
are likely to have different characteristics that require immediate reduction of angle-of-attack. Airplanes with low, wing-
mounted engines may require delayed application of power until the airflow is re-attached (by reducing the angle of 
attack) and airspeed is gained to avoid the nose-up pitching moment from further aggravating the stall. Hence,  there 
may be a gap in the transferability of the skills gained during basic training to the air transport category operation.
Spin training has been abandoned for several years due to safety concerns.  While large transport aircraft may have 
significant difficulty recovering from a spin (usually considered an “unrecoverable upset”), performing a spin and 
recovery during initial training may be beneficial for demonstration purposes. In fact, learning the recovery skills 
related to spins can be beneficial towards avoidance as well.
Current commercial pilot training and checking in simulators focuses on areas such as stall prevention by teaching 
recoveries from approach-to-stall condition. Yet,  the data indicate that prevention is not foolproof, and the inability to 
recover from entry into the actual stall condition is clearly a significant problem. In many cases, pilots have applied 
incorrect control inputs, worsening the situation, and even ignoring or fighting the envelope-protection systems of their 
aircraft. The following recent examples support this finding:
1. Colgan Air flight 3407, pilots continued to apply control back pressure even though Q-400 was stalled.
2. USAir 427 accident, where the crew also applied continued back pressure until impact.
3. West Caribbean 967, stalled at high altitude and crashed
4. Pinnacle Air 3701, stalled at high altitude and crashed
5. Turkish Airlines 1951, stalled on approach and crashed
6. USAF C-5 Galaxy, stalled on approach to Diego Garcia and recovered
The Colgan accident led the National Transportation and Safety Board to issue several new recommendations 
relevant to the upset recovery problem, particularly those that are stall-induced.3   These are:
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators and 14 Code of Federal Regulations  Part 142 
training centers to develop and conduct training that incorporates stalls  that  are fully developed; are unexpected; involve 
autopilot disengagement; and include airplane-specific features, such as a reference speeds switch. (A-10-22)
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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III. Requirements For Upset Prevention and Recovery Training 
Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity  requirements to support  an expanded set  of stall recovery training 
requirements, including recovery from stalls that are fully developed. These simulator fidelity requirements should address 
areas such as required angle-of-attack and sideslip angle ranges, motion cueing, proof-of-match with post-stall flight test 
data, and warnings to indicate when the simulator flight envelope has been exceeded. (A-10-24)
Training based on awareness and prevention alone appears to be insufficient. Carbaugh et. al.,4 indicate that variable 
situations and outcomes, a lack of training, and the fact that crews became startled by rare events are three major 
reasons why there have been so many accidents. It was also found that crews used improper recovery techniques in 
many cases, indicating that training left them unprepared to respond properly in these situations. The most remarkable 
finding was that most of these situations were recoverable, but successful recoveries were not commonplace. Their 
work went further and reported that simulator-based training,  coupled with involvement from an instructor, specifically 
trained to provide upset recovery training, showed a significant improvement to successful recovery techniques as well 
as higher consistency.
One possible way of preventing upsets is through effective flight envelope protection. Maintaining the aircraft state 
within acceptable structural and aerodynamic limits can be achieved by these systems. However,  even in such aircraft, 
significant incidents have been reported. These are often due to (a) the crew being unaware that the disturbance was due 
to an external event,  (b) failure of an aircraft system, or (c) mismanagement of the systems (e.g., A320, Perpignan, 
November 20085).  This suggests that even in these aircraft it would be beneficial for crew to be prepared to handle 
upset incidents.
Based on accident data, enhanced stall prevention and recovery training is considered a major goal of ICATEE. By 
developing the required skill sets, pilots can be taught to respond properly to stalls in most situations well in advance of 
them becoming safety critical. In providing the tools for training or for demonstrations, a satisfactory representation of 
the flight vehicle is warranted. Academics and in-flight training of stalls are also supported.
III.  Requirements For Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
The upset prevention and recovery training objective is to maintain situational awareness in normal flight (in order 
to prevent upsets), and in the event of an upset, to apply the correct action. In some cases, applying corrective action 
preemptively when the aircraft is not upset can also lead to undesirable consequences. A key requirement is to avoid 
negative training, as this could lead to inappropriate reactions during flight.  History has proven that negative simulator 
training can propagate to fatal consequences due to an incorrect learning process6. Because UPRT cannot take place in a 
single medium that is fully representative of the actual aircraft environment, there are benefits as well as potential 
negative training aspects to each of the training media or elements. 
If one employs simulators that lack sufficient fidelity outside the normal envelope for upset training applications, 
this could in turn teach an inappropriate and unsafe recovery technique. For example, if training of recoveries in the 
simulator leads to over stressing the simulated aircraft model beyond its physical limits, this could be considered an 
inappropriate and counter-productive use of simulation. One example is American Airlines flight 587, which 
experienced a structural failure due to the pilot applying excessive rudder input in the presence of wake turbulence6. 
Inappropriate simulator training was blamed as one of the causes of the incident. In this case, the lack of fidelity in a 
simulator to portray lateral accelerations  meant that the pilot was not able to “feel” these significant forces in the 
training device when applying full and reversed rudder inputs. This could have been a compelling demonstration on the 
“power” of the rudder,   and the inappropriateness of full and reverse rudder flight control inputs.  Note that the AURTA 
provides a good demonstration of this phenomenon, and explains how this can be performed in current Level D 
simulators at the current level of fidelity. The key challenge here is not a technical one alone, but involves making the 
correlation of the danger associated with rudder reversal to the pilots in training. The instructor plays a key role in the 
AURTA to mitigate the risk of negative training.
In addition, this lack of acceleration fidelity would inhibit the instructor pilot from identifying the misuse of this 
flight control if such a control input was used by a pilot. The benign accelerations represented in a simulator commonly 
led to excessive flight control inputs by pilots. There are no negative consequences for the aircraft in the simulator, as it 
cannot be “over stressed”. Additionally, there is a lack of standardized knowledge in the instructor pilot ranks on the 
limitations of simulators in representing excursions into the extended envelope and the negative training that can result 
from such excursions in training exercises. 
Acquiring data that are suited to the potential extreme flight conditions of upsets is a challenge however. The 
required level of accuracy and coverage is a big question,  as incorrect data could also lead to erroneous interpretations. 
Additionally, there would be a potential danger and cost associated with collecting real flight data to model the 
extended envelope sufficiently in simulation. For this reason, many researchers resort to alternatives,  such as the use of 
computational fluid dynamics of unsteady flows.
Beyond the technical challenge, there is a demographic one. In civil aviation, we have now transitioned away from 
the military supplying 80-90% of professional pilots to the inverse, 10-20% of professional pilots. This demographic 
change has resulted in the vast majority of incoming pilots into the airline inventory having little-to-no actual exposure 
to “all-attitude” aircraft training, nor an emphasis on upset aerodynamic academics.  In examining the upset accident 
literature, it is not uncommon now for the pilots involved in these accidents to have had no actual exposure to a real 
aerodynamic stall and or pitch/roll excursions in an actual aircraft beyond the normal envelope (e.g., Q400, Buffalo, 
February 2009).3
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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IV. ICATEE Approach to the Integrated UPRT 
IV. ICATEE Approach to Integrated UPRT
ICATEE consists of a team of specialists representing over 40 organizations from seven categories (airframe 
manufacturers, regulatory bodies, training providers,  simulator providers, industry bodies, airline operators and research 
agencies/academia). The ICATEE team is organized into two main streams, namely, Training & Regulations, and 
Research & Technology.
Since June 2009, ICATEE has concluded that the provision of comprehensive UPRT requires a balanced 
combination of the following three training elements:
A - Academic knowledge (familiarity with aerodynamics, stalls, recognition of upsets).
B - In-flight exposure and training in an all-attitude/all-envelope environment in aerobatic-capable airplanes
C - Simulator-based training, specific to UPRT
The training requirements developed by ICATEE have culminated into a detailed training matrix, identifying the 
required skills and knowledge for each mitigation level and event within. This has helped identify the specifications for 
each of the training elements. It must be emphasized though that to prepare a pilot for all the levels of mitigation 
(awareness, prevention and recovery), exposure to the three training elements is required.
Table 1 shows the differences between the existing curriculum and the recommended additions for the academic 
component of stall training. Note that in addition to the expansion of the curricula, ICATEE is also recommending 
further qualification of instructors to provide the in-depth know-how in UPRT.
Table 1. Curriculum enhancements for academic stall training
STALL - ACADEMIC ELEMENTS Existing Curriculum Recommended Additional 
Curriculum (further instructor 
qualification required)
High AOA Performance X
Pre-Stall X
High AOA Instability X
Stall Buffet X
Stick Shaker/Pusher Familiarization, operation, recovery X X
Aircraft-specific characteristics X
Accelerated Stall X
Nose below Horizon Stall X
High altitude stall X
Stall with yaw present X
Stall break X
Incipient spin X
Developed spin X
Managing g-loading X
Tailplane icing X
A significant portion of ICATEE’s recommendations relates to practical training and checking. Currently, most 
manual flying skills are developed at the basic level,  and the limited exposure to the “edges” of the flight envelope are 
also taught here. In looking toward long-term implementation of the ICATEE principles of integrated academics and 
practical training, a new recommendation is to require exposure to an all-attitude full-envelope environment in aerobatic 
aircraft at the commercial licensing level. This would mandate that all new-hire pilots aiming for a career in commercial 
transport flight operations be exposed to these conditions.
The existing pilot fleet would be required to perform training and checking in flight simulators only,  since the 
economics of teaching these skills to this large population are preclusive, and several of today’s pilots do have exposure 
through prior military careers.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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V. Simulator Requirements and Possible Solutions 
Table 2 illustrates the practical skills enhancements associated with the ICATEE recommendations for airplane 
stalls,  based on the use of aerobatic-capable aircraft and UPRT-certified flight instructors. The capabilities of full flight 
simulators (current and enhanced) are also shown in this table concerning stall training needs.
Table 2. Practical skills development for stalls, through simulators and aerobatic-capable aircraft, compared to 
current means
PRACTICAL SKILLS DEVELOPMENT; SIMULATOR VS 
AIRCRAFT
FFS
(existing 
resources)
Existing normal-
category training 
aircraft
Aerobatic-Capable 
Aircraft allowing all-
attitude all-envelope 
instruction
G-orientation & exposure X (limited) X
Unusual attitudes X X X
All-Attitude exposure X
High AOA performance X X X
Pre-Stall X X X
High AOA instability X
Stall buffet X (limited)* X X
Stick Shaker/Pusher familiarization, operation, recovery X
A/C specific characteristics X
Accelerated stall X X
Nose below horizon stall X X X
High altitude stall X
Stall with yaw present X (limited) X
Stall break X (limited)* X X
Incipient spin X (limited) X
Developed spin X
Managing g-loading X (limited) X
Airframe, wing, tailplane icing X (limited)*
* improvements being recommended by ICATEE
V. Simulator Requirements and Possible Solutions
Simulation technology has matured over the past several decades to a point where they are an acceptable surrogate 
to in-flight training and checking for most conditions and events.  Simulator qualification documents define the levels of 
fidelity pertaining to specific types and levels of training,7 while other documents define the testing procedures to meet 
these qualification requirements.8
However, upset prevention and recovery training requires the preparation of pilots for unexpected situations, where 
the training focuses on introducing the crew to realistic scenarios that, if encountered in real life, would require 
immediate and corrective action, and the information that indicates the onset of these conditions in order that they are 
acutely avoided. Are there any reasons to believe then that simulators today can satisfactorily meet these requirements?
Today, simulators are used in UPRT, even though their data may not be accurate for some of these situations. It 
should be noted that most upsets do not occur outside the validated envelope: A roll excursion can accumulate by a 
long-term roll rate at very low angles of attack and sideslip. Recovery in real life, however,  may lead to high 
aerodynamic angles, or high loads on the airframe. A concern shared within ICATEE is whether some simulations and 
training exercises actually lead to negative training.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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A. Representative stall model (and training need) 
From the above, four primary objectives are derived:
a) Ensure the simulator model, where necessary, is representative of the aircraft for the training purpose
b) Allow realistic introduction of the upsets to the simulation
c) Allow the instructor to interject numerous safety-critical and realistic scenarios.
d) Provide feedback to the candidate regarding the status of the aircraft with respect to the allowable operating 
envelope
A. Representative stall model (and training need)
A prinicpal aim of the ICATEE working group was to evaluate and define the potential extension to the simulated 
flight envelope that is required to train upset prevention and recovery effectively. A public law now exists within the 
United States applicable to simulator training to (A) recognize and avoid a stall of an aircraft or, if not avoided, to 
recover from the stall; and (B) to recognize and avoid an upset of an aircraft or, if not avoided, to execute such 
techniques as available data indicate are appropriate to recover from the upset in a given make, model, and series of 
aircraft. 9 According to the US Law, the term ‘‘stall’‘ is defined as an aerodynamic loss of lift caused by exceeding the 
critical angle of attack. In order to train full stall recovery, the aerodynamic envelope that is required to support a 
“representative model” is currently undefined.
The training objectives that are identified for the stall recovery that affect the aerodynamic stall model are:
• Pre-stall characteristics and awareness cues
• Effect on control effectiveness prior to stall
• Reduced lateral stability
• Stall warning systems (including stick pusher)
• Effect of icing (on aerodynamics and stall warning systems)
• High altitude stall considerations
• Effect of thrust
While the current aerodynamic models support many of these objectives, there are some objectives that are only 
partially, or not, supported. The intention of the development of a representative stall model is intended to address these. 
The ICATEE group has assessed the existing aerodynamic models that are available, identifying three zones within the 
stall maneuver (see Figure 1). 
The green zone represents the pre-stall warning region where the training is currently focused, simulator 
qualification standards are fully defined, and models are available across the industry – the normal flight envelope. The 
yellow zone represents the area between the initial stall warning activation, and the aerodynamic stall point. In this zone 
the current data available are more limited,  and there are fewer specific requirements for the aerodynamic model. In the 
red zone, aerodynamic stall, there is currently no requirement to train in this region,  and there is only limited flight test 
data available for many aircraft, if at all.
As an illustration to identify the bounds of the regions, for a commercial transport with flaps down, the angle of 
attack for CLmax is around 20 degrees, with the Stick Shaker occurring at around 15 deg AOA. With flaps up, the 
associated alpha for CLmax is about 14-15 deg, and Stick Shaker at 10-11 deg.
Stick pusher (if available)
Stall warning
StallCL
α
Normal Flight Approach to Stall Fully-Developed 
Stall
Figure 1. Regions of stall models
The training objectives that have been identified emphasize the familiarization element of training stall recovery. 
The aim of the training is to prepare pilots for the situation that they may encounter, while recognizing that the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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B. Instructor Operator Station 
behaviour of the aircraft in this region is highly dependent on a number of factors, and therefore not easy to predict. It 
has therefore been recognized that a representative model is appropriate for this region (rather than a specific 
aerodynamic model).  This is also in part due to the limitations of flight test data and modeling that affect the production 
of a specific model for each aircraft type and model. ICATEE is therefore working to define a guideline that will enable 
representative models to be used, and qualified on FSTD’s. This standard will consist of both subjective and objective 
assessment.
The main outcome of the ICATEE analysis is that current simulator technology and the associated qualification 
guidelines need improvement to provide acceptable value for the simulation of upsets for the training of awareness, 
prevention and recovery. The salient points will be reviewed in the Discussion section of this paper.
Table 3. Stall flight regimes and training objectives
Flight Regime Training Objectives
Training value Normal Flight Approach-to-stall Stalled
Longitudinal control Awareness or flight envelope, 
recognition of stall warnings, 
avoidance of stall
Recognition, avoidance and 
recovery by reducing AOA
Recovery by immediate 
reduction of AOA
Lateral control Awareness of effects of 
maneuvering on stall speeds
Avoidance of excessive lateral 
control inputs
Awareness of potentially 
complex lateral handling 
during recovery; g-break
Power Little impact on upset prevention Depending on aircraft class, may further increase AoA
Current Simulator 
Capabilities
Math Model Available Generally available Requires additional 
development
Buffet Model Available; emphasis on high-
amplitude buffets
Aircraft could demonstrate 
subtle pre-stall buffet cues 
(could be missing in simulator)
Requires development
Motion cues Present, but subjectively tuned. Due to subjective tuning, may 
lack appropriate correlation with 
aircraft dynamics
Subjective; may be 
inappropriate for training
B. Instructor Operator Station
Transferring knowledge to candidate pilots requires a high standard for instructors that teach and check pilots 
operating in the regimes of upsets and similar challenging flight conditions. Current flight simulators limit the 
instructor’s knowledge of what the actual airplane would have encountered in an upset situation. Additional feedback is 
required for the following:
a) Where the simulated aircraft is within the validated flight envelope, and if it is in an unvalidated region.
b) Feedback of the normal load factor during the maneuver (Illustrated in Figure 2 by a V-n envelope diagram 
as an example).
c) Control inputs exercised by the pilot, which should occur in a timely and non-abrupt manner, with 
avoidance of large excursions with reversals (such as rudder input)
d) The state of the aircraft (through the flight instruments).
The information could be displayed to the instructor, and played back during briefing/de-briefing sessions, to give 
the pilot better insight into the upset onset and recovery. Figure 2 shows a proposed display format,  with each screen 
providing the feedback to items a), b), c) and d) above, respectively.
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Figure 2. IOS feedback on simulation for validated or extended α-β envelope, aircraft V-n, flight control inputs, 
and aircraft state.
C. Scenarios and Startle
ICATEE was asked to identify methods for including the effect of surprise and startle within the training 
environment.  Within Loss of Control – In Flight occurrences the unexpected nature of the event has often contributed to 
the challenge that crews faced in responding appropriately. These effects are often a combination of psychological and 
physiological factors. The investigation of these effects is described in Bürki-Cohen.10 
As a result of this study, the working group within ICATEE created a number of scenarios where the intention was 
to include the surprise element. These scenarios are intended for application in existing training schemes using 6 DoF 
FSTDs, and are therefore focused on the cognitive elements of the surprise factor. The scenarios are based on the Line 
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) concept,  and are intended to form part of the LOFT training. In total 12 scenarios were 
created where an operational flight setting was combined with distracting factors in addition to an event that could 
result in an aircraft upset. These scenarios were implemented in the FAA’s simulation facility in Oklahoma City for 
evaluation by the ICATEE pilot group.
The goal of creating surprise in the simulator is to indirectly train pilots to effectively handle LOC-I events, while 
primarily concentrating on the number-one task of flying the airplane. Much current upset training that is conducted in 
FSTDs is maneuver-based training which results in one pilot conducting pre-announced upset recovery training. The 
emphasis of scenario based training is presenting realistic upset scenarios in the context of how they might occur in 
normal line operations and compel the crew to apply crew resource management in the prevention and recovery. The 
intention is to effectively evoke the physiological, psychological and behavioural responses associated with in-flight 
surprise events, by reducing the “simulator mindset” and compensating for the absence of real-life risk. The latter can 
be achieved by creating an in-flight atmosphere (full adherence to procedures in the flight deck), stressing the pilots 
with tasks and distractions, and then presenting them with surprise-inducing events.  A key goal in training is to prevent 
inappropriate responses,  such as a primal reaction that exacerbates the situation or flight condition, not returning to a 
secondary activity (like FMS programming) when control is regained, fighting envelope protections, or applying control 
interventions that exceed the aircraft performance envelope.
The evaluation of the scenarios from the pilot group demonstrated that it was possible to include an element of 
surprise. While this was not a full evaluation experiment, it does demonstrate the potential for application in training. 
The response from the pilots was positive and illustrated that an element of surprise could be achieved in a simulation 
environment.  Concerns were raised about the risk of a scenario being communicated to other pilots before their training. 
The aim would be to ensure that a large number of scenarios are available to the instructors. In this way, by applying the 
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E. Buffet 
F. Motion Feedback 
distracting factors in varying degrees, the unpredictability of the scenario can be maintained and pilots are required to 
assess each situation as it arises.
D. Continuous Control Authority
A beneficial way of illustrating upsets is by replaying in the flight simulator time histories of known upsets from 
flight data recorder information. Commanding synchronized responses of the simulator instruments,  controls, visual 
display and sound can be beneficial in providing informative feedback. However, additional learning takes place when 
pilots are also able to prevent such upsets from developing into the consequences to which a particular recorded historic 
event led. Therefore,  in the case of replayed upset events, the simulation must be configured so that the pilot is able to 
recognize and to prevent the upset from building. While a demonstration alone, if desired, can also be a valuable 
learning exercise,  interactive learning significantly reinforces the recognition and avoidance of upsets. If the simulator 
does not permit pilot response or if the controls are frozen to follow the model, the resulting inability of the pilot can be 
frustrating and limiting to an attitude of upset prevention.
E. Buffet
Current buffet models may not necessarily present accurately the subtle vibrations that may be present when a 
transport-category aircraft approaches a stall.  The aerodynamic buffet associated with the pre-stall phases is an essential 
cue to the pilot of a potential upcoming stall.  In some situations, such as severe wing icing, it is possible for this 
aerodynamic cue to be the first warning of a stall that the pilot receives for some aircraft. This is also an effect that can 
be, and is, included in the simulator for training. However, ICATEE’s analyses have indicated that the buffets in 
simulators may manifest later than they would in the real-life situation. It has also been reported that, like stall models, 
there can be considerable variability in pre-stall buffets which may occur in some situations, and be completely lacking 
in others. 
The FAA Advisory Circular providing guidance for conducting flight tests to certify a commercial transports (FAA 
AC25-7B)11 notes a definition of initial buffet for the stall as +/- 0.05 G (e.g. 0.1G peak to peak).  If this threshold is 
used as the first indication of buffet during a stall it would come too late since some flight test data shows that this level 
of buffet may not occur until well into the stall for some aircraft/configurations. However, since the human perception 
system is capable of detecting buffets of less than half that amplitude, ICATEE is recommending that simulation 
modelling of pre-stall buffets includes low-amplitude vibrations,  particularly when they can be detected early and 
before the stall. An assessment of the available flight test data is being applied to define an appropriate lower peak-to-
peak threshold for buffet onset.
In addition, ICATEE is examining the stall buffet qualification tests. While objective tests of the buffet are desirable 
for different flight conditions (e.g. cruise, climb, approach and landing), there is recognition that the current power 
spectral density (PSD) analysis method may not be the most appropriate for this dynamic flight condition. This is a 
potential area for further research to define an alternative method. It is recognized that the availability of flight test data 
– stall time history and accelerometer data for the PSD analysis – is a consideration for the feasibility of objective 
testing, since it may not be possible to produce data for older aircraft types.
F. Motion Feedback
Motion feedback assists a pilot in controlling a dynamic system due to the faster response time of the vestibular 
system compared to the visual system. In certain cases, an aircraft may demonstrate reduced stability in the region close 
to a stall, meaning the stability time constants and mental workload may increase. Furthermore, in some cases,  there 
may be non-linear behaviour associated with the control inputs and vehicle response, particularly in roll. In such cases, 
the presence of motion feedback may lead to a response by the pilot that is representative of that achieved in the 
aircraft. This may help enhance the learning process, particularly with regards to avoidance of such conditions.
One particular learning element in the ICATEE training matrix where pilots should learn to avoid these areas of the 
flight regime is unloading the wing by reducing angle-of-attack. Maintaining the high angle-of-attack increases the 
workload and effort required. Realistic representation of these conditions can be beneficial in training avoidance. 
Through the vestibular system, the pilot can become aware of appropriate and inappropriate control inputs.
In the longitudinal degrees of freedom, pilots need to be aware of the angle-of-attack primarily, which is not 
necessarily coupled to the pitch attitude.  In simulators, the motion drive algorithm and motion platform attempt to 
provide the pilot with feedback on the specific force, rather than the inertial accelerations. When properly configured, 
and in concert with the instrument and visual information, the simulator can provide an instructional benefit by 
presenting the pilot with potentially confusing signals that may lead to incorrect response to the pitch attitude, rather 
than the angle-of-attack. Again, the training objective it to get out of this area of the flight envelope by reducing the 
angle of attack.
It is important to note that all the above are dependent on the aircraft type,  state, condition, and even configuration. 
What is most important for the training goals is that the simulator provides accurate feedback, without negative cueing. 
Instructor involvement in the feedback process can also be important in helping a pilot to avoid, for example, abrupt 
control inputs, or even use a control input that could lead to aggravation of the state during a particular condition.
Motion feedback often differs between simulator platforms, primarily because objective criteria are not used for the 
qualification and test of motion cueing systems. The motion drive algorithms, motion platform and the digital 
implementation in flight simulators introduces differences in both gain and phase with respect to the motion cues that 
would otherwise be perceived by pilot in the airplane. An alternative technique that was proposed12 has been 
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incorporated into the ICAO 9625 Manual, 8 and is expected to support the standardization of motion cueing systems 
across flight simulator platforms.
A generally-accepted consideration is that the lack of g-cues in hexapod-type simulators limits their benefit during a 
recovery phase. Even abrupt maneuvering for which the specific forces and angular accelerations cannot be accurately 
presented in a motion base (without the presence of significant false cues). Reduction of motion amplitudes is one 
alternative, however little research has been performed to support a proper conclusion.
The ICATEE training matrix has proposed that for teaching g-orientation (reduced, negative, increased), managing 
g-loading, for spatial disorientation during recoveries, and high bank-angle recoveries, continuous-g devices may be 
employed. These systems could provide a ground-based alternative to in-flight training for some parts of the flight 
envelope, while also offering a representative civil transport cockpit environment. Figure 3 shows the interior of the 
Desdemona simulator,  Figure 4, which has a continuous-g capability (up to 3 g) as well as six degrees of freedom 
motion. The generic transport cockpit is part of the SUPRA European project13, taking place currently.
G. Upset Forcing Function
The creation of upsets in flight simulation is a subject of contention. In current training practices, several methods 
exist. In some cases, one pilot brings the aircraft into an upset, while the other is then required to recover. In other cases, 
the instructor introduces an upset through the IOS. There are also cases where the instructor fully prepares a pilot for an 
upset and guides them through the situation before asking them to recover.
ICATEE has recommended that an upset be created in a realistic manner. From an analysis of accident 
investigations,  upsets have often occurred when the pilots were distracted, loaded with non-flying tasks, inattentive, or 
during conditions where it was not expected. Hence,  an externally-generated stimulus could be created. Conceptually, 
the aircraft “flies” into a zone where an external forcing function introduces an artificial roll rate to the airplane, for 
example, upon the command of the instructor operator. The pilots, if aware of the situation, can respond to it in a 
constructive manner and exercise the proper avoidance or, if necessary, recovery techniques.
VI. Discussion
Simulator modelling and fidelity specifically aimed at improving feedback to the pilot in flight regimes 
corresponding to extended envelopes have been discussed so far.  The key issue that needs to be understood is the effort 
required to achieve these goals, the true training benefit of going beyond what is available today (including the dangers 
of negative training), and the ability to consistently apply the results on a broad scale.
The main areas requiring further development in flight simulation are outlined in Table 4. Areas identified by 
“Enhancements Necessary” are areas of near-term development. The inclusion of enhanced stall models and icing 
effects is an area of longer-term developments.
Figure 3. Transport airplane cockpit configuration 
of Desdemona continuous-G flight simulator. 
Image courtesy TNO.
Figure 4. Six-degrees-of-freedom plus continuous-
G motion system of Desdemona flight simulator. 
Image courtesy TNO.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
10
  
NLR-TP-2011-346 
  
 13 
 
VII.  Conclusions & Future Work 
Table 4. Recommended enhancements in flight simulation to support UPRT
For the levels of mitigation, one of the main improvements required in training awareness skills is not the simulator 
but the instructor. For prevention, where the first indications of an upset may occur, icing models and stall buffet 
enhancements are recommended.
The area of recovery training in simulators is one that will also require enhancements to IOS feedback,  the 
implementation of scenario-based training and methods of externally driving the upsets. Calibration of stick pushers, if 
available, are also recommended. The main technical challenge is in the improvement of stall models.
For all the above,  technical development supported by research that considers also the benefits of these 
enhancements is necessary. For the majority of the developments, solutions are fairly accessible.  The enhanced 
modeling of stalls will require long-term research and development.
VII. Conclusions & Future Work
Given that LOC-I is the main cause of fatalities in commercial aviation,14 coupled with the lack of systematic 
training to prevent upsets that lead to the associated accidents in this area, it is valuable to consider how simulation 
technology can contribute to improving the safety record. Pilot awareness of the causes of upsets, recognition of the 
initial indications and corrective avoidance are the first and foremost steps. Sometimes,  corrective action can include 
taking no action, by recognizing that the aircraft may on its own perform the required corrective action through the 
automated flight control system. In the rare event of an upset, pilots should be equipped with the skills to effectively, 
safely and reliably recover from these situations.
Upset prevention and recovery training requires a comprehensive approach involving academics, in-flight training, 
and flight simulator exposure. Simulation is the closest representation of the cockpit environment, and provides the pilot 
with exposure to the instrument conditions associated with upsets. In most cases,  the motion cues are restricted due to 
the limited motion envelope of the hexapod. 
The main areas of improvement to flight simulation technologies that ICATEE recommends are:
• Improved modeling of the fully-developed stall regime, including a representative model of the airplane
• Improved buffet modeling to provide accurate awareness cueing
• A standardized motion cueing criterion
• An upset training IOS
• Scenarios that induce surprise
• An external aircraft upset forcing function
In the long term, additional issues need to be considered. Stall model fidelity and modeling techniques, as well as 
icing effects are of primary concern.
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